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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not uncommon for trusts cases decided in Commonwealth jurisdictions to affect the 
general  development  of  the  law  of  trusts.  While  as  a  matter  of  comparative  law  the 
jurisprudence of Malaysian courts have seldom received much attention, the recent decision 
in PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad
1 served as an occasion for the highest 
court  in  Malaysia  to  consider  the  Quistclose  doctrine.  Unusually,  this  case  followed  and 
applied  the  primary-secondary  trust  analysis  of  Lord Wilberforce  in  Barclays  Bank  Ltd  v 
Quistclose Investments Ltd
2 as the proper legal basis of the Quistclose trust in Malaysia. A 
careful inspection, however, reveals that the Federal Court’s decision reflects a distortion 
both of the specific facts of the case and of legal principle. 
 
II. FACTS 
 
The appellant PECD Berhad (“B”), a public-listed company, was the parent company of one 
PECD Jaya Holdings Sdn Bhd, which had executed a Murabahah Notes Issuance Facility 
Agreement for the issuance of Islamic notes up to the value of RM200 million. These were 
subscribed by a syndicate of 14 noteholders. The respondent AmTrustee Berhad (“C”) was 
the trustee appointed pursuant to a trust deed to act for and on behalf of the noteholders in 
respect of the Islamic notes.  
 
PECD Jaya Holdings Sdn Bhd subsequently defaulted in its repayment obligations under the 
notes. At B’s request, C refrained from commencing legal proceedings against PECD Jaya 
Holdings  Sdn  Bhd  to  enforce  its  rights  under  the  trust  deed.  In  consideration  for  the 
indulgence given by C, B agreed to earmark RM30 million out of the proceeds of a rights 
issue proposed to be undertaken by B, to be paid to C towards partial redemption of the 
Islamic notes. This was confirmed by way of a letter of undertaking issued by B to C. The 
relevant portions of the letter provided as follows: 
                                                           
1  PECD  Berhad  (In  Liquidation)  v  AmTrustee  Berhad  [2014]  1  MLJ  91  (Federal  Court,  Malaysia) 
www.kehakiman.gov.my/directory/judgment/file/02_f_%E2%80%93_59-08-2012_W.pdf  (accessed  21 
February 2014). 
2 Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 (HL).  
[I]f  the  [monies  owing  under  the  notes]  is  not  less  than  Ringgit  Malaysia  Thirty  Million 
(RM30,000,000.00),  we  will  pay  or  cause,  and  ensure  the  payment  of  at  least  Ringgit 
Malaysia Thirty Million (RM30,000,000.00) from the proceeds raised or to be raised from the 
proposed renounceable rights issue of new ordinary, shares of RM0.50 each in [B] together 
with warrants … to you as the [trustee] towards payment or settlement of the [monies owing 
under the notes] or any part thereof for the benefit of the Noteholders … 
 
[W]e will not make any repayment and/or prepayment of all or any loan or advance obtained 
by [B] from any of its shareholders until and unless the [monies owing under the notes] shall 
have been fully settled … 
 
In notices, circulars and a prospectus issued by B in respect of the proposed right issue to 
B’s shareholders (“A”), B had stipulated that part of the proceeds of the proposed rights 
issue would be utilised to pay C as partial redemption of the notes issued by PECD Jaya 
Holdings Sdn Bhd. This fact was also disclosed by B to the Securities Commission and 
Bursa Malaysia (formerly the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) as required by the relevant 
securities legislation. B raised a sum in excess of RM104 million through the rights issue 
exercise, all of which was credited into a special 'PECD Rights Issue Account'. However, B 
failed to pay C the sum of RM30 million as agreed, and B soon thereafter became insolvent. 
B proposed several restructuring schemes in which the RM30 million was to be distributed to 
all of B's creditors including C, contrary to the agreement between B and C. The proposed 
schemes were rejected by B's creditors. C subsequently commenced proceedings against B 
seeking payment of the RM30 million on the ground that it was held on trust by B for C. 
 
III. DECISION 
 
In the High Court C’s claim was allowed. The judge held that on the facts, the RM30 million 
from the proceeds received by B from the rights issue exercise was specifically advanced for 
the purpose of paying the noteholders, and accordingly was held on a Quistclose trust by B 
in favour of C. B’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was unanimously dismissed. Curiously, the 
Court of Appeal in upholding the High Court judge’s finding of the Quistclose trust observed 
that  A,  the  subscribers  of  B's  rights  issue,  did  not  envisage  a  return  of  their  share 
subscription because they had received their rights shares; and as such the RM30 million 
was held on trust for C, the intended recipient of the monies.
3  
 
The Federal Court granted B leave to appeal on a sole question of law, namely ‘whether the 
beneficiary of a Quistclose [trust] can in law be a person who is not a provider or payor of the 
money’ (“the leave question”). The Federal Court held that on the facts of the case, as B had 
earmarked  the  RM30  million  to  be  paid  to  C  with  the  express  knowledge  of  A,  C  had 
acquired  a  beneficial  interest  in  the  RM30  million  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  noteholders. 
Applying  Lord  Wilberforce’s  primary-secondary  trust  analysis  in  Barclays  Bank  Ltd  v 
Quistclose Investments Ltd, the Federal Court held that these facts gave rise to a primary 
trust in favour of C that was still capable of being enforced against B, notwithstanding the 
fact that C did not provide the funds itself. 
 
It should be noted that there was a second, separate originating summons (“the second OS”) 
that involved the same parties and the same subject matter. There, a differently constituted 
panel of the Court of Appeal had held, by way of a majority decision, that although the RM30 
million was raised by B from A and was intended to be used to pay the noteholders, C and 
the noteholders were not beneficiaries of the RM30 million under a Quistclose trust as the 
provider of the funds was A and not the noteholders. A had paid the money to subscribe the 
                                                           
3 Noted in PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [27]. The judgments of the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal are not reported. rights issue shares from B, instead of paying the noteholders the sum due under the notes. 
Therefore, C and the noteholders stood in the same position as any unsecured creditor in 
the event of B’s insolvency.
4  
 
As such, when B’s appeal came before the Federal Court of Malaysia, there were in fact two 
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of the Court of Appeal arising from the same set of 
facts on the issue of whether the RM30 million was held on a Quistclose trust by B in favour 
of C. Interestingly, the Federal Court’s attention was  in fact  drawn to the two  conflicting 
decisions. Instead of addressing the confusion, however, the Federal Court simply brushed 
aside the Court of Appeal’s decision in the second OS by observing as follows:
5 
 
In respect of the leave question we find that it accepted, albeit impliedly, as a fact or at least 
presupposes, that the [notices, circulars, prospectus and letter of undertaking issued by B]  
had created a trust, in particular a  Quistclose-type of trust. Otherwise the obvious question 
should have been whether the various documents created a trust in favour of [C]. Hence, we 
find no merit in the submission of learned counsel for [B] that the combined effect of the 
letter of undertaking and the circular 'cannot support any case for the creation of a trust fund 
of RM30 million to be held by [B] as trustee on a primary trust for [C]'. 
 
Accordingly we are left to consider whether [C], which did not provide the said monies but 
identified to receive it, could enforce the trust. In other words, can the respondent claim the 
said monies? 
 
… as indicated above, the leave question accepted, albeit impliedly as a fact or at least 
presupposes,  the  existence  of  a  Quistclose  trust  based  on  the  given  facts  and 
circumstances. As such the said monies would not be a subject in the winding up proceeding 
of [B]. Further, it is therefore not necessary for us to deal with the view expressed by the 
majority in the Court of Appeal in the second OS on the issue of Quistclose trust. Thus, the 
remaining issue is whether [C] can claim the said monies. 
 
The Federal Court observed that the Court of Appeal in the appeal before it ‘seemed to say’ 
that the requirements or elements of a Quistclose trust had been satisfied despite the fact 
that C was not the provider of the monies.
6 Yet, the majority of the Court of Appeal in the 
second OS had expressly held that a Quistclose trust was precluded from arising because C 
and the noteholders were not the provider of the RM30 million. It is respectfully submitted 
that it was unsafe for the Federal Court to decide the appeal before it in the way that it did, 
especially when no concession was made by B on the point concerning the second OS. The 
Federal Court should have addressed the issue of whether a Quistclose trust arose on the 
facts at all, which was clearly a live issue between the parties, instead of manipulating the 
leave question to sidestep this crucial issue altogether.  
 
Furthermore, in approaching the leave question as it did, the Federal Court appears to have 
overlooked an earlier binding decision of its own that held that an appellant may argue a 
ground  of  appeal  that  falls  outside  the  scope of  the questions regarding  which  leave  to 
appeal had been granted in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
7 Quite apart from the 
                                                           
4 PECD Bhd & Anor v AmTrustee Bhd and other appeals [2010] 5 MLJ 35 (CA, Malaysia) at [75]– [76]. The 
minority was of the view that a Quistclose trust arose in favour of C on the ground that ‘a contractual promise to 
apply earmarked monies for a specific purpose create [sic] an equitable trust in those monies by way of trust 
based on the proposition that it is unconscionable for a man to give an undertaking and obtain money on terms 
as to its application and then to totally disregard the terms on which the monies were to be applied’: see [2010] 5 
MLJ 35 [38]. B’s application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court in the second OS was dismissed. 
5 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [35]–[36], [56]. 
6 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [29]. 
7 Menteri Sumber Manusia v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia [1999] 2 MLJ 337 (Federal 
Court, Malaysia). See also Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349 (HL) 367: ‘It is obvious difficulties with the reasoning of the Federal Court, discussed below, it is clear that B 
would legitimately be entitled to feel a real sense of injustice and be aggrieved at the manner 
in which the Federal Court dealt with the appeal before it. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
IV.1. The Quistclose Doctrine: General Principles 
 
When  A  loans  money  to  B,  the  default  position  is  that  a  purely  personal  contractual 
relationship  is  created  between  the  parties.
8 A  Quistclose  trust  arises  exceptionally  in  a 
specific fact situation, where A loans money to B to be used exclusively for a particular 
purpose, for instance that of repaying a particular creditor, C. If B performs the purpose, the 
beneficial interest in the money vests absolutely in C, and the relationship between A and B 
is one of debtor-creditor. Conversely, if the purpose is not performed, A can demand the 
return of the money under a trust. It is the parties’ intention that determines whether a loan of 
money from A to B is a Quistclose arrangement. The Quistclose doctrine thus aims to give 
effect to the intention of the parties.  
 
Certainly, it is not only the creation of a Quistclose arrangement that turns on the intention of 
the parties; it is likewise pivotal in the creation of an express trust. Thus, if A, as settlor, 
wishes to transfer property to B to hold on trust for C’s benefit, it is trite law that A must 
manifest a certain enough intention to create a trust.
9  
 
The difference between an intention to create a Quistclose trust and an express trust is fine 
but crucial. Whereas in the creation of an express trust the parties intend for C to obtain the 
beneficial interest in the property once it is constituted to B, a Quistclose arrangement does 
not. Instead, a purpose is involved: the parties contemplate that the purpose for which A 
advances  the  money  to  B  may  not  be  carried  out—therefore,  C  (that  is,  the  person  or 
persons who would benefit from B’s carrying out of the exclusive purpose) does not obtain 
an  immediate  beneficial  interest  upon  B’s  receipt  of A’s  money.  B’s trust  obligation  in  a 
Quistclose arrangement is not to hold the money on trust for C; instead, it arises because 
B’s use of the money is constrained by the stated exclusive purpose. This explains why the 
purpose for which B may use the money must be an exclusive purpose: it ensures that the 
money loaned to B is not at B’s free disposal, thus giving rise to a trust relationship between 
A and B instead of a purely personal debtor-creditor relationship.
10  
 
IV.2. A Loan? 
 
As earlier discussed, in PECD the Federal Court approached the appeal before it on the 
presupposition that a Quistclose trust arose in respect of the RM30 million that was part of 
the proceeds from the rights issue exercise carried out by B. This is regrettable. The Federal 
Court had noted, and did not disagree with, the Court of Appeal’s finding that A could not be 
described as lenders of the RM30 million.
11 The Federal Court also accepted that A did not 
envisage a return of their subscription  monies  because they had   received their rights 
shares.
12 Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal in the second OS pointed out, A had paid the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
familiar and well known that one thing which this House considers in deciding whether to give leave in a civil 
case is whether the case involves a point of law which ought to be considered by this House. But, once leave is 
given, this House can and does consider other points as well’ (per Lord Reid).  
8 See  Barclays  Bank  Ltd  v  Quistclose  Investments  Ltd  [1970]  AC  567  (HL)  580;  Re  Holiday  Promotions 
(Europe) Ltd [1996] BCC 671 (Ch) 674; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164 [69]. 
9 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beavan 148, 172–3; 49 ER 58, 67–68; Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11, 
14–15. 
10 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164 [73]–[74]. 
11 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [29]. 
12 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [29]. money to subscribe the rights issue shares from B as opposed to paying the noteholders the 
sum due under the notes.
13 The absence of a loan by A to B on the facts would have been 
fatal to the claim that the RM30 million was impressed  with a Quistclose trust, since there 
was  no  evidence  that  A  intended  for  the  money  to  be  returned  to  them  under  any 
circumstance. 
 
Short of an advance of the monies as a loan, the proceeds of the rights issue by B became 
the working capital of B and fell to be dealt with by B’s directors in the best interests of B, 
and was not subject to the control or direction of either A or C. In any event, and tellingly, A 
did not at any point in time insist that B should pay the RM30 million to C. There was nothing 
in B’s letter of undertaking or the subscription agreements for B’s new shares that provided 
for the preservation of A's rights and the control either by A or C of the use of the proceeds 
of the rights issue, let alone the RM30 million, through the medium of a trust.
14 
 
IV.3. An Exclusive Purpose? 
 
Even assuming that the RM30 million could be treated as a ‘loan’ or ‘advance’ by A, the 
Federal Court did not in any event consider the question of whether the RM30 million could 
be  regarded  as  having  been  advanced  for  an  ‘exclusive’  purpose.  The  highly  unusual 
manner  in  which  the  appeal  was  decided  meant  that  this  crucial  factor  was  overlooked 
altogether. The RM30 million, claimed by C to be subject to a Quistclose trust, in reality 
formed part of the proceeds of the rights issue exercise in excess of RM104 million, which 
was  intended  to  be  utilised  for  several  purposes.  Only  one  of  those  purposes  was  the 
proposed payment to C as partial redemption of the notes. It is not possible to interpret the 
facts such that A subscribed for the new shares on the condition that the monies paid by 
them was to be utilised solely for the purpose of repayment to C and none other. Unlike the 
facts of Quistclose, where the parties went to the lengths of placing the money in a separate 
account  opened  specifically  for  the  purpose  of  the  payment,  in  PECD  the  whole  of  the 
proceeds of RM104 million was credited into a special 'PECD Rights Issue Account', and the 
RM30 million was not specifically placed in a separate account to be operated solely for the 
purpose of paying C. The fact that the RM30 million was mixed with the rest of the proceeds 
of the rights issue clearly points away from any intention to create a trust.
15  
 
IV.4. Enforcing the ‘Primary Trust’?  
 
Suppose the Federal Court was correct in deciding on the facts that A had advanced the 
money to B exclusively for the purpose of repaying C. The question then arises: was the 
court correct to enforce the ‘primary trust’ in favour of C? It is highly significant that there is 
not  one  English  case  that  purports  to  enforce  the  ‘primary  trust’:  the  courts  have  never 
compelled B, the recipient of loan money, to apply the property for the exclusive purpose as 
agreed between the parties. Indeed, it would be impossible to do so in some cases such as 
Twinsectra,
16 where the purpose is expressed in vague terms.  To insist that the ‘primary 
trust’ is a trust in the strict sense of the word contradicts two core tenets of orthodox trust 
principles. The first is the beneficiary principle: ‘a trust may [not] be created … for a purpose 
or object unless the purpose or object be charitable, for a purpose or object cannot sue’.
17 
                                                           
13 Noted in PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [27].  
14 Bieber and others v Teathers Ltd (in liquidation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1466, [2013] 1 BCLC 248. See also 
Challinor v Juliet Bellis & Co [2013] EWHC 347 (Ch). 
15 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [129]. See also Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 
UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164 [71]. 
16 The purpose in that case was for the  ‘acquisition of property’: Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, 
[2002] 2 AC 164 [9]. 
17 Leahy v AG for New South Wales [1959] AC 457 (HL) 479. The second is the rule that the settlor drops out of the picture once a trust is properly created 
and constituted. If a Quistclose arrangement creates a trust for C’s benefit, what remaining 
interest does A have by which he can demand the return of the money in any circumstance? 
This is why the House of Lords held in Twinsectra v Yardley
18 that, when B receives A’s 
money, B holds it on trust for A, subject to a power in B’s favour, which is revocable by A at 
any time, to apply the money according to the agreed purpose. It follows that C is not a 
beneficiary who has a right to the money, but merely an object to whom B may pay the 
money if B decides to do so. 
 
In  enforcing  the  ‘primary  trust’,  the  Federal  Court  misunderstood  the  significance  of  the 
requirement for  an  ‘exclusive  purpose’  in  a  Quistclose  arrangement. The  purpose  is  not 
significant as an end in itself; the focus is instead on the implication of the ‘exclusivity’ of the 
purpose: it reflects the parties’ intention that the money is to be returned to A if it is not 
applied for the stated purpose. As Lord Wilberforce observed in Barclays Bank v Quistclose, 
‘by  process  simply  of  interpretation,  …  if,  for  any  reason  the  [purpose]  could  not  be 
[attained], the money was to be returned to [A]: the word “only” or “exclusively” can have no 
other  meaning  or  effect’.
19 A can only demand the return of the property if B holds the 
property  on  trust  for  A  in  the  meantime .  Therefore,  contrary  to  the  Federal  Court’s 
observation, the Quistclose doctrine is concerned with enforcing the parties’ intention that B 
will hold the money on trust for A pending application for the stated purpose. This explains 
why there is no English decision that enforces the ‘primary trust’. 
 
Even if it is arguable that the ‘primary trust’ is indeed capable of being enforced in some 
situations, it is at least clear, based on the authority of Barclays Bank v Quistclose, that B will 
be deemed incapable of carrying out the ‘primary trust’ in the event of B’s insolvency. In 
PECD, however, even B’s insolvency was insufficient to convince the Federal Court that the 
‘primary trust’ had failed. If the court’s decision on this point were correct, there seems to be 
no other event left that would trigger the ‘secondary trust’. And an arrangement that involves 
a ‘primary trust’ that will never fail cannot properly be classified as a Quistclose trust at all.  
 
IV.5. The Potential Recipients of the Monies Returned 
 
If we suppose that the Federal Court could contemplate that the ‘primary trust’ would fail in 
some event, the question arises: to whom would the money be returned upon the failure of 
the ‘primary trust’? As to this question, the Federal Court considered it ‘fortunate’ that it was 
able to avoid providing an answer, given that, in its view, the facts and circumstances of the 
case  did  not  demand  such  a  finding.
20 It seems, however, impossible on the facts to 
determine a principled answer to that question had the circumstances of the case called for 
it. In particular, it would not have been possible to identify  the parties’ intention as to the 
recipients of the monies to be returned. The rights issue exercise carried out by B for the 
injection of funds from its shareholders raised a sum of RM104 million, of which only RM30 
million was to be paid to C.
21 It would have been impossible to ascertain the shareholders 
who advanced the latter sum who would have the right to the return of the monies.  
 
Even if the monies were earmarked such that it was possible to iden tify the shareholders 
who  were  entitled to the repayment,  it remains impossible to determine whether those 
shareholders did in fact intend for the monies to be returned to them upon B’s failure to pay 
                                                           
18 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164. Their Lordships unanimously adopted the view 
expressed in PJ Millett, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269, 284. 
19 Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 (HL) 580. 
20 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [67]. 
21 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [6], [10]. the money to C. In the first place, it is only plausible that the subscribers of the rights issue 
exercise intended to become shareholders of, or increase their existing shareholding in, B. 
Indeed, as discussed above, this was the express finding by Court of Appeal in the second 
OS. This negates any intention that the RM30 million was to be returned to them if it was not 
paid  to  C.  Even  if  some  of  those  shareholders  had  an  intention  sufficient  to  create  a 
Quistclose arrangement, it would have been necessary to determine whether the majority of 
those shareholders in question had such an intention, since it is arguable that anything less 
would not evince an intention that B should use the monies for an ‘exclusive purpose’ such 
that  a  Quistclose  trust  was  created.  The  Federal  Court  clearly  should  have  been  more 
vigilant in its determination of the parties’ intention instead of finding that a sufficient intention 
to create a Quistclose arrangement arose from the mere fact that the shareholders were 
‘well informed on the proposed utilisation of the proceeds of the exercise.’
22 
 
IV.6. The Leave Question 
 
The leave question that the Federal Court specifically had to determine was ‘whether the 
beneficiary of a Quistclose [trust] can in law be a person who is not a provider or payor of the 
money’.
23 The question, phrased as such, is misleading, as it fails to distinguish between two 
very  different  situations.  The  first  situation  is  a  case  where  A  transfers  money  to  B,  B 
agreeing to apply the money exclusively for an agreed purpose, failing which the money will 
vest absolutely in X. Although X is a third party who was not a ‘provider’ of the money, in 
principle the Quistclose doctrine would compel B to hold the money on trust for the benefit of 
X, subject to a power in B’s favour, revocable by A
24 at any time, to apply the money for the 
exclusive purpose. X would then be able to demand the repayment of the money from B if 
the exclusive purpose is not carried out. This result coheres with the doctrine’s emphasis on 
giving effect to the parties’ intention. PECD was, however, not a case of this sort. Instead, 
the  ‘person  who  is  not  a  provider  …  of  the  money’  in  question  was  C,  the  so-called 
‘beneficiary’ of the exclusive purpose; and the question was whether C was able to enforce 
the  ‘primary  trust’.  As  already  discussed,  there  is  no  basis  in  principle  or  authority  for 
suggesting an affirmative answer in this case. 
 
IV.7. Creating New Law? 
 
On one reading of the decision in PECD, it might be suggested that the Federal Court was in 
fact  creating  new  law,  extending  the  Quistclose  doctrine  beyond  its  settled  scope  of 
application. Curiously, the court chose to cite at length an article by Barrie Lawrence Nathan, 
‘In Defence of the Primary Trust: Quistclose Revisited’,
25 to justify its decision, instead of 
considering the more widely cited texts on the subject.
26 In that article, Nathan suggests that 
a ‘more just’
27 result is achieved if the ‘primary trust’ is enforced where ‘the loan is nominally 
for a purpose, but there is a specific property and there are specific creditors who can be 
identified and would be capable of enforcing the trust on Re Denley principles.’
28 
 
A close examination reveals two reasons why this argument lacks a  principled rationale. 
First, on Nathan’s argument, the enforcement of the ‘primary trust’ turns on the specific facts 
of a case: it differentiates between cases where there is an identifiable creditor(s) behind the 
                                                           
22 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [9]. 
23 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [30]. 
24 Of course, the agreement may alternatively provide that that the power is revocable at X’s will. 
25 Barrie Lawrence Nathan, ‘In Defence of the Primary Trust: Quistclose Revisited’ (2012) 18 OJT&T 123. 
26 See eg David Hayton, Paul Matthews and Charles Mitchell,  Underhill  and  Hayton:  Law  of  Trusts  and 
Trustees (18
th edn, LexisNexis 2010) [1.25]; John McGhee QC (ed), Snell’s Equity (32
nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2010) [25-035]; Jill E Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (19
th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) [2-009]. 
27 Nathan (n 25) 123.  
28 Nathan (n 25) 128–9. Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 373 (Ch). specific  purpose  and  cases  where  there  is  not.  An  ‘identifiable  creditor’  is,  however, 
demonstrably  not  a material fact  that  determines  how  and  whether  a  Quistclose  trust  is 
enforced. Suppose that the parties in two different cases intend B to use the money loaned 
from A for an exclusive purpose, the only difference being that an ‘identifiable creditor’ can 
be determined behind the purpose in one case but is absent in the other. What justification is 
there for the diametrically different outcomes that would result if Nathan’s argument were 
adopted? After all, the content of the parties’ intention as to the beneficial use of the loan 
money in both cases are identical; and the difference in outcome would make a mockery of 
the courts’ aim to give effect to the intention of the parties. This is why courts do not take it 
upon themselves to enforce the specific purpose itself, but instead focus on the implication 
of the ‘exclusivity’ of the stated purpose: it is taken to indicate a positive intention that the 
money is to be returned to A if it is not applied for the stated purpose. 
 
A  second  problem  with  Nathan’s  argument  stems  from  its  reliance  on  the  case  of  Re 
Denley’s.
29 In that case, Reginald Goff J held that  a trust set  up by a company ‘for the 
purpose of a recreation or sports ground … for the benefit of the employees of the company’ 
was a valid trust that did not offend the beneficiary principle because the benefit to those 
employees was direct or tangible.
30 While the case does decide (albeit arguably incorrectly) 
that those employees had ‘locus standi to apply to the court to enforce the trust’,
31 it does not 
also hold  that  they  were  beneficiaries  such  that  they  could  exercise  their  Saunders  v 
Vautier
32 rights to collapse the trust and call for the monies. By allowing C to demand the 
monies in B’s hands in PECD, the Federal Court was unjustifiably extending the (already 
doubtful) authority of Re Denley’s, with the upshot of distorting the Quistclose doctrine vis-à-
vis Malaysian law. 
 
IV.8. Reconciliation: An Express Trust? 
 
Given the difficulties with the Federal Court’s analysis, it seems much more plausible instead 
to explain PECD as a straightforward express trust, created for the benefit of C. Since the 
Federal Court insisted that the leave question presupposed that the various documents in 
the parties’ dealings had ‘created a trust in favour of [C]’,
33 it would have been unnecessary 
and irrelevant to go on to hold that that trust was a ‘primary trust’ under the  Quistclose 
doctrine. Instead, it would have been open to the court to decide either that A had expressly 
transferred the monies to B as trustee for the benefit of C, or that B had expressly declared 
itself as trustee for C’s benefit upon receipt of the monies from A.  
 
At the very least, the straightforward express trust analysis would have led the Federal Court 
properly to address the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal as to whether or not a 
trust  arose  in  respect  of  the  RM30  million  to  begin  with.  It  would  also  have  adequately 
addressed  the  concerns  shared  by  the  lower  courts  in  PECD  as  to  B’s  unconscionable 
behaviour,  which  would  have  amounted  to  both  breach  of  its  letter  of  undertaking  and 
contravention of the relevant securities legislation, as well as the courts’ desire to uphold 
                                                           
29 Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 373 (Ch). 
30 Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 373 (Ch) 383. 
31 Re  Denley’s  Trust  Deed  [1969]  1  Ch  373  (Ch)  383.  It  is  arguable  whether  English  law  recognises  the 
‘enforcer principle’ at all—that is, whether a trust can be valid where there are merely ‘enforcers’ of the trust 
instead of identifiable beneficiaries: see Paul Matthews, ‘From Obligation to Property, and Back Again’ in DJ 
Hayton (ed), Extending the Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-Fenced Funds (Kluwer Law International 
2002). Cf David J Hayton, ‘Developing the Obligation Charateristic of the Trust’ (2001) 117 LQR 96. 
32 Saunders v Vautier (1841) Cr & Ph 240. 
33 PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [35]. shareholder  protection  and  market  integrity,
34  without  having  to  strain  the   principles 
governing the Quistclose doctrine in order to justify its decision. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The misapplication and distortion of the Quistclose doctrine created by the decision in PECD 
seems to hark the demise of the Quistclose trust under Malaysian law, since the principles 
propounded by the Quistclose doctrine would cease to have any real scope for application if 
‘primary trusts’ do not fail even in the event of B’s insolvency. It is sincerely hoped that the 
decision  in  PECD  will  be  overruled  by  the  Federal  Court  of  Malaysia  at  the  earliest 
opportunity  so  as  to  avoid  this  manifestly  undesirable  development  in  the  law.  More 
importantly,  it  is  hoped  that  the  decision  in  PECD  would  serve  as  an  indication  to 
Commonwealth jurisdictions how not to develop the Quistclose doctrine so as to avoid an 
irreconcilable distortion of trust principles. 
 
                                                           
34 See eg PECD Bhd & Anor v AmTrustee Bhd and other appeals [2010] 5 MLJ 35, [2010] 1 CLJ 940 (CA, 
Malaysia) [38], [41] and [71]; PECD Berhad (In Liquidation) v AmTrustee Berhad [2014] 1 MLJ 91 [23], [27], 
[64]–[65]. 